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Analysis, book reviews and photography from Abkhazia and the wider Caucasus — updates when time permits

Ankvab changes mind, proposes abolishing Vice President, not Prime Minister

On 31 January, President Ankvab sent a draft constitutional amendment to Abkhazia’s People’s Assembly that would abolish the position of Vice President. The proposal itself is not strange. Ankvab’s representative to the People’s Assembly Dmitri Shamba argues (as was pointed out here before) that the Vice President does not fulfill a clear function and that it is a post which few countries have, especially in combination with the post of Prime Minister (the only other country in Europe is Bulgaria). The most important purpose of the Vice Presidency has so far been to facilitate political alliances in the run-up to elections and to resolve the 2004 post-election crisis (although arguably that eventually proved unsatisfactory for Raul Khajimba precisely because the Vice President has so little power).

The reason why this decision is nonetheless somewhat surprising is that in late 2012, Ankvab had argued that Abkhazia should rather abolish the position of Prime Minister, as the Vice President enjoyed a direct popular mandate (although that logic is flawed, since Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates run on one ticket, and the former presumably plays the largest role in determining a voter’s choice).

Ankvab’s change of heart may have been influenced by (or may well have influenced) the announcement last December by Mikhail Logua that he was resigning as Vice President due to health reasons.

Filed under: Abkhazia, , , ,

The shared history of President Ankvab and former Interior Minister Leonid Dzapshba, now prosecuted for corruption

Last month, Leonid Dzapshba was indicted for corruption. The charges relate to his Chairmanship of the Abkhazian Football Federation, but Dzapshba is better known as the previous Interior Minister of Abkhazia. The indictment has caused some rumour because Dzapshba defended himself, first in an interview with Nuzhnaya and then through a press conference, where he was supported by family members, and perhaps more notably, Sergei Shamba, who was Prime Minister at the relevant time, and which in turn triggered a response by the General Prosecutor’s Office.

The details of the affair are a bit confused. Dzapshba is accused of abusing 7 million ruble of Football Federation funds, buying cars for himself and his family and going on trips abroad, ostensibly to bring the cause of Abkhazian football to the likes of Sepp Blatter and Michel Platini. Dzapshba says that he did in fact meet them, as evidenced by a thank you letter by President Bagapsh, and that the 7 million ruble deficit arose in the construction of football pitches, that he had received permission from President Bagapsh to this amount using government funds, but that this became impossible following Bagapsh’s unexpected death.

Dzapshba claims the charges are politically motivated. It is true that President Ankvab apparently did not get along with Dzapshba. Ankvab of course denies that he himself is involved, and the prosecutor’s office claims that the case was initiated by the new management of the Football Federation.

It seems unlikely that the charges are completely made up, because Dzapshba is not exactly a powerful or popular politician that Ankvab must get rid of. After Dzapshba’s appointment by President Bagapsh, some of his initial actions triggered enthusiasm, but this quickly died down, and the decision by President Ankvab not to reappoint him after his election was generally received positively, even if he was replaced by his perhaps equally unpopular predecessor. And his financial legacy at the Interior Ministry is apparently also controversial.

The prosecution of Dzapshba has also been criticised for the fact that while he himself may not be clean, members of the current government are not equally targeted. But the fight against corruption has to start somewhere. The prosecution of former officials can in the long run have a positive effect on sitting government members, if they realise that their current actions may have consequences once they are out of power.

If Ankvab is in some way pushing Dzapshba’s prosecution, the affair is ironic given the fact that Dzapshba can be said to have given Ankvab’s career a decisive push all the way back in 1992, during the height of the Georgian-Abkhazian ‘war of the laws’, before the actual war broke out. On the 8th of May that year, the new convocation of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia appointed a number of Ministers, including Alexander Ankvab on Internal Affairs. There was a problem though, because the previous Minister, the Georgian Givi Lominadze, refused to leave, backed by the Georgian Interior Ministy. This situation was only resolved on 24 June, when a group of officials forcefully evicted Lominadze from the Ministry. Among these officials was Leonid Dzapshba.

Filed under: Abkhazia, , , ,

Independents defeat prominent politicians in Abkhazia’s parliamentary elections

Last Saturday, on the 10th, Abkhazia held the first round of its fourth parliamentary elections since gaining independence. I have fitted the results into a big table on Wikipedia. The results from constituency 21 are not yet known, due to heavy snow fall, and there will be a rerun in constituency 1 as the 25% turnout threshold was missed by a hair.

These elections fit into a long-term trend: Abkhazian elections have been becoming ever more competitive. 148 candidates competed for just 35 seats, out of a total 156 that had originally been nominated. On average, four candidates competed in each constituency. And while there were five constituencies with just two candidates, there was also one constituency with as many as ten candidates. Accordingly, only 13 candidates won an outright first round majority, and no candidate won more than 75% of the votes cast.

The results are something of an upset, as many prominent politicians lost out to new, independent candidates. This includes a number of experienced MPs, like Communist Party leader Lev Shamba (11%), Chairman of the Human Rights Committee Batal Kobakhia (9%) and Vice-Speaker Sergei Matosyan (25%). Others, like Speaker Nugzar Ashuba (28%), Vice-Speaker Irina Agrba (27%) (a political ally of President Ankvab) and former Gali Governor Ruslan Kishmaria (27%) will have a very tough time winning their second round.

The elections were also disappointing for a number of former government members seeking to become MP. These include Anri Jergenia (22%), Prime Minister under President Ardzinba and once considered his successor, who in recent years supported opposition leader Raul Khajimba. Similarly unsuccessful was Almasbei Kchach (25%), Internal Affairs Minister and Security Council Secretary under Ardzinba, running mate of opposition leader Beslan Butba in 2009 and since then a prominent member of Butba’s Economic Development Party. Or Daur Tarba (9%) and Vakhtang Pipia (15%), both Vice-Premiers under President Bagapsh and the former Chairman of ruling party United Abkhazia. Indeed, opposition leader Raul Khajimba is about the only exception, achieving the highest first round win with 73% of the votes in his constituency — he may very well try to succeed Nugzar Ashuba as Speaker.

In general, all parties appear to have performed badly. The Communist Party saw none of its seven candidates win or even reach the second round. Only one of the six candidates nominated by the Economic Development Party reached the second round. Of the eleven candidates nominated by United Abkhazia, only one was elected outright, and only four reached the second round. Of the eleven candidates nominated by the Forum for National Unity, one candidate was elected outright (Khajimba) and six reached the second round. This means that independent candidates will form a majority in the new Parliament. Even though these may still end up forming pro-government and opposition camps, this could mean a more active and self-conscious Parliament.

In the light of the very poor performance by United Abkhazia, the question is justified whether these results constitute a defeat for President Ankvab. The answer is probably no, Given that United Abkhazia is not Ankvab’s party, even though it supports him, and that he has distanced himself somewhat from the United Abkhazia-led government of his predecessor, Sergei Bagapsh. That said, the results do indicate that voters are thoroughly dissatisfied with the current Parliament and with past governments. This should provide a strong incentive for President Ankvab to intensify his reforms.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, Wikipedia, , , , , ,

Abaza TV gains national coverage

Last week, something happened that has not seemingly attracted the attention of English-language media, but which may turn out to be quite important for the development of Abkhazian society. On 11 November, President Ankvab signed a decree authorising Abaza TV to broadcast throughout Abkhazia, where until now it had been limited to Sukhum only. Abaza TV is Abkhazia’s only private TV channel, and while it is not really independent, it does provide an important platform for political dissent. (Abaza TV is owned by opposition politician Beslan Butba, which is why it is a good thing he lost the 2009 and 2011 Presidential elections.) Until the arrival of Abaza TV, newspapers were the most important media of Abkhazia — State TV is not that relevant, with most viewers preferring Russian TV.

The fortunes of Abaza TV from its founding in 2007 are traced in an article by Vitali Sharia over at Ekho Kavkaza. It had been refused permission to broadcast outside Sukhum for several years now. Ankvab had promised to change this, but reportedly, even after the death of President Bagapsh, Ankvab deliberately waited until after the August 2011 election to make good on his promise.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Media, , , ,

Wikipedia: Abkhazia’s Presidential election

As more and more becomes known about Abkhazia’s upcoming Presidential election, I (and others) will gather the information in the corresponding Wikipedia article.

Similar articles exist for the February 2011 local elections and the 2009, 2005 and 2004 Presidential elections.

As of now, as expected Raul Khajimba and Alexander Ankvab have been nominated by initiative groups, while Sergei Shamba has said that he is waiting for the 40 day mourning period after Sergei Bagapsh’s death to pass. Khajimba has also received the backing of his opposition party, the Forum for the National Unity of Abkhazia, and he his to run with Svetlana Jergenia as his running mate, who is the widow of first President Vladislav Ardzinba. He is evidently hoping to thus profit from Ardzinba’s status as a national hero, but it should be noted that Jergenia narrowly failed to win a seat in Parliament in the 2007 election (admittedly before Ardzinba passed away).

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, Wikipedia, , , , , ,

Who will succeed Sergei Bagapsh?

For the first week or so after the unexpected death of President Sergei Bagapsh this morning, following surgery in Moscow, Abkhazia will predominantly be mourning. But then the question of his succession will inevitably come up. In line with the constitution, Vice President Alexander Ankvab is now acting President, but an election has to be organised within three months, that is before August the 29th.

Had Bagapsh not died, Abkhazia could possibly have enjoyed three more years of steady growth and a dozen or so of additional countries to recognise its independence. This could have strengthened Abkhazia’s statehood to an extend where even a bad outcome of the next election would not have been able to do as much damage as e.g. President Kokoity is doing now for South Ossetia. However, this was not to be, which means that a lot depends on the qualities of the next President of Abkhazia.

Conversely, as wry as it may sound, Bagapsh’s death may also have positive consequences for Abkhazia. It is a cynical fact that now that he has passed away, Bagapsh’s legacy will be very positive, which will both set a positive norm domestically and improve Abkhazia’s reputation abroad. Also, the fact in itself that Abkhazia will now witness another democratic transition will have similar effects. And while a new President could disappoint, this does not need to be the case. After Bagapsh became President, a lot changed for the better. But many reforms seem to have slowed down, and his government has failed to solve any of the bomb attacks that have hit Abkhazia during the last couple of years, nor the murder of Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs Zakan Jugelia, nor any of the four attempts at Alexander Ankvab’s life. Add to this the general impression that too many Abkhazian official see their post as a business opportunity first and a responsibility to be taken serious second, and it is clear that there is a lot of room for improvement which an energetic newcomer could tackle.

So what are the likely candidates in the upcoming election?

Within the government there are two obvious candidates, Alexander Ankvab and Sergei Shamba. Both have aspired to the Presidency in the past and may find that now the time is ripe to achieve their ambitions.

Ankvab is a member of Aitaira, which was formed in the Nineties by government officials who were dissatisfied with President Ardzinba’s policies. Ankvab was planning to run in the 2004 election to succeed Ardzinba, but his candidacy was rejected on the grounds that he did not satisfy the residency requirement and competence in the Abkhaz language. This was probably foul play, but it led Ankvab to support Sergei Bagapsh’s candidacy, and he became Prime Minister after the latter had won the election and the ensuing stand-off with Ardzinba’s preferred candidate Raul Khajimba (the ‘Tangerine revolution’). Then, in 2009, when Bagapsh was re-elected, Ankvab became his Vice-President. If he chooses to run, Ankvab could take his ally, chairman of Aitaira and First Vice-Premier Leonid Lakerbaia as his running mate. Alternatively he could pick Natela Aqaba, chair of the Public Chamber which unites civil society representatives.

Shamba too is a very experienced politician, perhaps even more so than Ankvab. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1997 and held the post until 2004 when he resigned in protest following the murder of opposition member Garri Aiba and to prepare his own candidacy for the presidency. In the election, he scored a respectable third place behind Bagapsh and Khajimba and thus established himself as an independent force. The post-election crisis eventually ended with a power-sharing agreement between Bagapsh and Khajimba under which Khajimba (who became Vice-President) selected Shamba to serve once more as Foreign Minister. Khajimba eventually left the government to try his luck again in the 2009 election, but Shamba stayed on and declared himself neutral, allowing him to take Ankvab’s place as Prime Minister after Bagapsh’s re-election.

Interestingly, neither Ankvab nor Shamba is a member of the main governing party United Abkhazia. Shamba used to be a member but was ejected in 2005 for running as an independent candidate in the 2004 election after he had lost the Vice-Presidential party nomination to historian Stanislav Lakoba. This leaves open the possibility that United Abkhazia might field its own candidate, who would stand a decent chance, since United Abkhazia has by far the best Abkhazian party network. United Abkhazia’s chairman Daur Tarba might be that candidate. His career has seen a steady upward trajectory during the last years, culminating in his becoming Vice-Premier in 2010, following Bagapsh’s re-election. However, he unexpectedly resigned last February, and some have mooted that Tarba’s Presidential ambitions had something to do with it. If so, these elections may come too early for his plans.

It also remains to be seen what the third government party, Amtsakhara, will do, which consists mainly of war veterans. It is no longer as influential as when it was first formed in the latter years of Ardzinba’s presidency, but it has a solid core base of supporters and counts some government ministers among its members. As such, it may prove to be a useful junior partner in any Presidential bid, and possibly field a Vice-Presidential candidate.

Among the ranks of the opposition, Raul Khajimba is the most obvious contender. He is still the most prominent leader of the opposition and has clearly not given up on his presidential elections. A second possible candidate is businessman Beslan Butba, who has initiated a lot of social projects, has styled himself as a new type of politician with no ties to Ardzinba’s government and also participated in the 2009 election, although his result there was disappointing. A third figure worth mentioning is Emma Tania, who is currently Vice-Speaker of the People’s Assembly and has been relatively active lately. All opposition politicians have one common problem, and that is the death of Sergei Bagapsh. People are still relatively satisfied with the current government, and it will be hard to criticise the policies of a dead hero, for Bagapsh will surely now be eulogised.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Abkhazian Army Purge? – Part 2

When a large number of senior members of the Abkhazian military was sent into retirement late April, this caused some speculation as to whether this wasn’t in reality a purge, and if so, whom this purge was directed against. One option was that Minister of Defence Mirab Kishmaria had removed officers with ties to the Russian Army, led by Chief of the General Staff Anatoli Zaitsev. Another option was that Kishmaria had indeed removed Zaitsev, but that in retaliation Russia had forced him to fire the others, so that the army could then get a new completely Russian command.

At the time, this was all speculative, we would get to know more once it would become known whom these men would be replaced by. Now, the first names have become known. On May the 21st, Colonel Beslan Tsvizhba was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence. Also, former commander of the Abkhazian missile and artillery forces Aslan Ankvab is the acting Chief of the General Staff, and it is likely that his position will become permanent. Tsvizhba and Ankvab are both Abkhaz, so it appears that if this was a purge, it had more to do with army-internal factionalism than with a Russian take-over.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Russia, , , , , , ,

Sergei Shamba succeeds Alyksandr Ankvab as Prime Minister of Abkhazia

The 12 December 2009 Abkhazian presidential election left many things as they were – Bagapsh won a second term and the composition of the cabinet is not likely to change radically. But since Alyksandr Ankvab was elected Vice President under Bagapsh, there was one vacancy: the Prime Ministership.

Today Bagapsh appointed Sergei Shamba to this position. Shamba has been the face of Abkhazian foreign policy ever since he was first named Foreign Minister on 7 May 1997, a position which he held for more than 12 years, interrupted only for half a year in 2004 when he ran in the presidential election that eventually brought Bagapsh to power.

Shamba’s appointed was not a complete surprise, since it had already been foretold by Abkhazian and Russian media, according to Civil Georgia. These same sources also predict that Shamba will be succeeded as Foreign Minister by his current deputy, Maksim Gvinjia. Still, in some ways it is unexpected. The Prime Ministership has always been the second-most important position in Abkhazia, second only to the Presidency. But presumably Ankvab’s move to the Vice Presidency is meant as a promotion, and he will want to give it more stature than before. This makes it unclear what responsibilities remain for the new Prime Minister and to what extend Shamba’s move is a promotion, given the amount of influence he has held as Foreign Minister.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, , , , , , , ,

The re-election of Sergei Bagapsh – probably the best outcome

On 12 December 2009, Sergei Bagapsh won a second term in the Abkhazian presidential election – Alyksandr Ankvab, the current Prime Minister, will become Vice President. Before the pair will be inaugurated on 12 February, I want to take a look back and argue that Bagapsh’s re-election was probably the best outcome for Abkhazia. I will begin by giving a quick summary of the circumstances that led to Bagapsh being elected for the first time five years ago, then I will discuss his track record during his first term in office and I will conclude by discussing his rivals in the December 12 election.

Bagapsh first came to power in 2004/05. In the 4 October 2004 election, he was the principal opposition candidate challenging then Prime Minister Khajimba, who had the support of out-going President Vladislav Ardzynba. The election resulted in a stand-off between Khajimba and Bagapsh that deeply divided Abkhazia’s society. Eventually Khajimba more or less accepted that Bagapsh had won the election and the two reached a power-sharing agreement: Khajimba would become Vice President and a new election was organised on 12 January 2005 to formalise the deal.

At the time, Bagapsh was the main candidate of the opposition that had arisen from the discontent with the state of the country under Ardzynba. It was inevitable that he would not completely live up to the hope that all would become better. In most areas, his results have been mixed.

Corruption is one of the most prominent problems in Abkhazian society. While there haven’t been any scandals implicating members of the central government, neither have there been many concrete results in the fight against corruption. The most notable case to be uncovered during Bagapsh’s presidency involved the Mayor of Sukhum Astamur Adleiba and the Municipal Housing Department. His removal was a success, but Adleiba had been appointed by Bagapsh upon his coming to power, and the case was made public while Bagapsh was in Moscow for medical treatment – not surpising then that Khajimba claimed the credit.

One of the major achievements of Bagapsh’s government and at the same time an important concern regards the amount of dissent tolerated in society. While even under Ardzynba, newspapers had always enjoyed a certain amount of freedom – only the room for plurality in Abkhazian society already present made Bagapsh’s election victory possible – society is generally seen to have become freer since. The opposition is free to protest, and no one was excluded from running in the recent election (in 2004 Alyksandr Ankvab was excluded on very dubious grounds, although this actually made the opposition’s victory possible, since the popular Ankvab then threw his support behind Bagapsh). Bagapsh also arranged for ordinary citizens to visit him and present their problems in person.

Yet there have been some incidents that are a cause for worry. In February 2009, the journalist Inal Khashig became the centre of a curious controversy. On the 3rd of February, Khashig had published an article in his newspaper Chegemskaya Pravda about the recent congress of President Bagapsh’s party United Abkhazia, which he criticised for lacking a political programme and blind loyalty towards the government. Then two weeks later, it was reported that on the 6th, Khashig had been taken by car to a sub-urban wasteland and threatened the fate of Dmitry Kholodov and Anna Politkovskaya lest he change his tone. Among the three perpetrators was said to be David Bagapsh, a nephew of the President and head of his presidential guard.

The news caused an outcry among opposition politicians, on the 18th a group of 31 journalists petitioned President Bagapsh to address the incident and members of the Public Chamber voiced their concern. Then, after initially refusing to comment Khashig himself essentially defused the story when he issued a statement in which he denied some of the more serious speculations. By Khashig’s account, the three man had merely him to a deserted part of the coastline, and taking into account that he was acquainted with two of them, he couldn’t describe the conversation as improper. Still, the episode left a bitter after taste.

More recently, on the 21st of September, the journalist Anton Krivenyuk was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence for libel. Krivenyuk had written an article for a Russian website, in which he criticised Bagapsh for handing over control of the Abkhazian railways to Russia, and the article had been republished in Abkhazian newspapers. This was the first time a journalist had been prosecuted in Abkhazia’s post-war history, even under former President Ardynba that had never happened.

These and smaller incidents were seen by some as directly related to the upcoming Presidential election. The election itself was generally perceived to have been reasonably free and fair, but far from perfect. One of the greatest problems was the undue advantage presented to Bagapsh and Ankvab through the use of administrative resources – including the participation of government officials in their campaign and the state TV’s extensive coverage of the government’s achievements.

A last area in which Bagapsh can be seen to have performed not as well as hoped is security. On the positive side, the situation in the Gali District is probably more peaceful than five years ago, mostly thanks to the policies of Bagapsh’s government. Furthermore, the capture of the upper part of the Kodor Valley during the August 2008 war and the subsequent recognition of Abkhazia’s independence by Russia greatly reduced the threat coming from Georgia, although it is not clear whether Bagapsh can be credited for this.

But what hasn’t changed is the government’s incapability to solve high level murder cases. Post-Soviet Abkhazia has seen a number of political assassinations which remained unresolved, among which the well-respected academic and Vice Premier Yuri Voronov in September 1995, and the former Mayor of Sukhum and opposition politician Garri Aiba in June 2004. During Bagapsh’s first term in office, Deputy Minister of the Interior Zakan Jugelia was added to that list when in January of 2009 he was shot while sitting on the verandah of café Kiki in Sukhum. Similarly, while it probably speaks in his favour that Prime Minister Ankvab was the target of no fewer than four assassination attempts during his time in office, what does not is that despite all its big words, the government has failed to identify any of the perpetrators. Nor has it been established who was responsible for the June and July 2008 and August 2009 bombings that killed a total of 6 people and injured at least 21 in the middle of the tourist seasons.

The government’s track record thus present a reasonable case that Bagapsh and Ankvab had not delivered enough, and that it was time for a new leader who would bring about the necessary government reforms and continue their work. But for better or worse, none of Bagapsh’s challengers in the election seemed suitable for that role.

Bagapsh had four opponents. Of these, the academic Vitali Bganba and his Vice Presidential candidate David Dasania are little known, and they did not feature at all in the campaign. Consequently, little can be said about them. The other three candidates were the subject of a useful background article written by Ardavadz Melkonian for NewCaucasus.com.

Bagapsh’s principal opponent was Raul Khajimba, who had lost the 2004 election and who had served as his Vice President until he resigned in May of 2009. Khajimba’s rhetoric during the election was good, and it spoke in his favour that Stanislav Lakoba – Bagapsh’s Vice Presidential candidate in 2004 – spoke highly of cooperating with Khajimba while in government and that he gave him his private support. Yet while Khajimba can be excused for not achieving much during his Vice Presidency, he doesn’t seem to have been much more effective as Prime Minister prior to the 2004 election. More damning still was the fact that Khajimba had been partially if not wholly responsible for the attempted election fraud in his favour in 2004. This presented a serious problem for his credibility. If indeed Bagapsh had not managed to resolve all the problems from Ardzynba’s era, and another step forward was required, Khajimba would actually have meant a step backward.

This was also the problem with Zaur Ardzynba, the next candidate, who acted closely in tandem with Khajimba throughout the campaign – the pair almost agreed to run as one team. Zaur Ardzynba’s post-independence CV did not extend much beyond having headed the State Shipping Company since 1994 and being rumoured to having become one of Abkhazia’s richest persons through controlling the fuel market. This firmly linked Zaur Ardzynba to the old system and it suggested a rather unfavourable disposition towards good governance et al.

The remaining candidate was the businessman Beslan Butba, and he was best positioned to claim that he would bring about real change. At 49, Butba was the youngest candidate, and he could already boast of financing a number of philanthropic projects, founding Abkhazia’s first private TV station Abaza TV, starting his own Party for the Economic Development of Abkhazia and presenting a number of concrete political proposals. But this record was seriously tarnished by the fact that he had replaced all of the journalists of his previously independent newspaper Ekho Abkhazii with political activists, and the fact that his campaign had solicited voters to sign a contract that they would vote for Butba. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, while it is a very good development that Abkhazia now has a private TV station, this would be for naught if its owner became President.

There is one more reason why it is probably for the best that these three opposition candidates did not win the election. One of Abkhazia’s greatest challenges in the coming years will be how it deals with the Gali District. The Gali District is inhabited almost exclusively by Mingrelians, and most of these do not hold Abkhazian citizenship (only 3522 passports have been distributed to the District’s 30,000 inhabitants). Now, until a couple of years ago, that did not matter much. But the current government has introduced the Abkhazian passport, which has become the central Identity Document within Abkhazia. This threatens to create a form of apartheid not unlike the situation in Palestine, and to turn Mingrelians into second-class citizens not just ethnically, but also administratively. And like Palestine, this not only presents a human rights problem, it also threatens Abkhazia’s hold over the Gali District. By necessity, at present its inhabitants mostly focus on their everyday survival, but as Abkhazia develops they will inevitably start to voice their discontents. And unless they have a future inside Abkhazian society, they will ultimately demand the secession of the Gali District to Georgia.

Many inhabitants of the Gali District do not want to adopt Abkhazian citizenship, especially since it would force them (by Abkhazian law) to abandon Georgian citizenship. But for many more, it is not even possible to obtain Abkhazian citizenship, since they did not live continuously in Abkhazia since 1993, having fled during the 1992-1993 or the May 1998 wars. Last summer, Bagapsh submitted to the People’s Assembly a law that would have made possible Abkhazian citizenship for those that returned no later than 1999. However, the plan provoked an outraged reaction from the united opposition. Its arguments were apparently the fact that the Mingrelians might come to act like a fifth column within Abkhazia, and/or that they would en masse vote for Bagapsh, as they had done in 2004, when they were still allowed to vote despite lacking citizenship. The government was forced to postpone it until after the election. It is to be hoped that now that Bagapsh has been re-elected, it will be adopted after all. Abkhazia cannot possibly hope to integrate the Gali District without granting citizenship to its inhabitants.

I have argued that there are several reasons why it was a good thing that Sergei Bagapsh was re-elected two months ago. But we have also seen that there is a lot of room for improvement. It is up to Sergei Bagapsh and Alyksandr Ankvab to live up to the renewed trust expressed in them by Abkhazia’s voters.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, Human Rights, Media, , , ,

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