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Analysis, book reviews and photography from Abkhazia and the wider Caucasus — updates most Wednesdays

New developments in Vanuatu

After a relatively uneventful period, three recent events in Vanuatu are relevant for relations with Abkhazia.

First, on 18 March Radio New Zealand International reported that Foreign Minister Alfred Carlot had over the weekend declared in a Radio Vanuatu interview that Vanuatu wanted to establish diplomatic relations with Georgia. And Director-General of the Ministry Johnny Koanapo denied to Radio New Zealand International that Vanuatu had ever established relations with Abkhazia, stating that the document signed at the time had only been a statement of intention.

Then, only a week later, the government of Prime Minister Sato Kilman was overturned in a no-confidence motion. In the new government, led by Moana Carcasses, Carlot was replaced as Foreign Minister by opposition leader Edward Natapei, an opponent of the recognition of Abkhazia.

And lastly, one of the very first acts of the new government was Natapei’s dismissal of Ti Tham Goiset as (designated) Ambassador to Russia and the Eastern Countries, including, presumably, at some future point, Abkhazia.

Koanopa’s statement seems patently false, as the document signed at the time was made public, and it unambiguously establishes diplomatic relations with immediate effect, and Foreign Minister Carlot is on record as reaffirming Vanuatu’s recognition of Abkhazia and the establishment of diplomatic relations, with the government’s official website carrying a message to the same effect.

Goiset has claimed that her dismissal is illegal since such a decision can only be taken by the President, but this in turn was contested by the Ministry.

It is worth noting that Koanopa did not deny that Vanuatu has recognised Abkhazia’s independence, and that Natapei has not addressed this either. Moreover, Abkhazian Prime Minister Leonid Lakerbaia has congratulated Carcasses with his appointment, and likewise, Foreign Minister Viacheslav Chirikba Natapei with his. Perhaps ni-Vanuatu officials have accepted that the recognition of Abkhazia cannot really be undone (unlike diplomatic relations, which can be broken off).

It should also be pointed out that ni-Vanuatu officials have a record of issuing contradictory statements. Thus, for example, the scandal that has plagued Vanuatu in recent months is that of the super-yacht Phocea. Towards the end of February, Phocea was issued provisional registration by the Maritime Technical Advisory Committee so it could leave Vanuatu. A week later, the Minister of Finance declared the committee ‘unqualified’, because “the Maritime Authority which appointed the Committee has been defunct since 2007″.

Filed under: Abkhazia, The Great Recognition Game, Vanuatu, , , , ,

Book review: Contested States in World Politics by Deon Geldenhuys

Contested States in World Politics
Deon Geldenhuys
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke
April 2009
305 pages
ISBN: 978-0-230-57552-3

A commonly heard argument against recognition of Kosovo or Abkhazia is that it would create an immense precedent, given that there are hundreds of separatist movements in the world. If Kosovo or Abkhazia, then why not also Kurdistan or Euskal Herria? This reasoning is partially correct, in that the decision to recognise a state should be based upon a due evaluation of the arguments pro and contra, and that surely a similar set of arguments in a different part of the world should lead to the same outcome. But mostly, this argument is unnecessarily alarmist, since it ignores the fact that as separatist causes go, Kosovo and Abkhazia are rather special.

Kosovars and Abkhazians control a delineated chunk of land with a permanent population (a state) whose independence may be recognised or not, whereas Basques nor Kurds have a sovereign polity that could be recognised. If some states are considering recognition of Kosovo or Abkhazia partially because this presents a mere coming to terms with reality, then this in itself is simply not a precedent for the Basques or the Kurds, or for that matter for the vast majority of the world’s separatist movements.

Contested States in World Politics by Deon Geldenhuys is about those ten cases which are somewhat similar to Kosovo and Abkhazia. Geldenhuys’s choice to designate these states contested over the more common de facto and unrecognised is a nice find. Many of the states in question enjoy some recognition, and contested captures much better than de facto that it is the legality (de jure) rather than the empirical existence (de facto) of their independence that is at stake.

Geldenhuys’s book is divided into two parts. The first is conceptual, the second summarises the background of each of the ten contested states.

Geldenhuys’s set of ten states still shows a lot of pluriformity. The core set of prototypical secessions is formed by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Somaliland, Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) and Nagorno Karabakh. Of these, the last four came about between 1989 and 1993 through the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While they recognise each other’s independence, only Abkhazia and South Ossetia enjoy some recognition by uncontested states. Kosovo is a late product of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, after it declared independence in 2008 it is now recognised by more than 80 states. Northern Cyprus seceded from Cyprus in 1983 following the 1974 invasion by Turkey, which is the only state to recognise its independence. Finally, Somaliland seceded in 1991 from its union with Somalia originally established in 1960 following their decolonisation. It remains completely unrecognised despite some diplomatic contact with neighbouring countries.

The remaining three cases are less straight-forward. The State of Palestine is the oddest one out among the ten contested states, as it is the only one that does not enjoy any de facto independence — it is almost as hypothetical as Kurdistan. It does not control any land or people — all it has is a nominal government, which doubles as the government of the autonomous Palestinian National Authority in Israel. Still, it has managed to obtain recognition by more than 120 states, which justifies its inclusion as a contested state. In addition, even Israel and the United States, in some sense its most ardent opponents, grudgingly recognise that a Palestinian State should come about at some point in the future. It thus serves as a much more relevant precedent for separatist Basques or Kurds than Kosovo and Abkhazia.

Next, the Republic of China, more commonly known as Taiwan, is also very special in that it has undergone a reverse development. It has been independent since 1912, its independence was previously uncontroversial and it used to control vastly more land and people than it does now. However, after its civil war with the communist counter-government, it was driven back to the island of Taiwan, and the great majority of states chose to recognise the communist state as the state of all China. The Republic of China is in the curious position that of all contested states, it provokes the least controversy, and is commonly identified as an independent country by non-state publications, despite being formally recognised as such by a mere 23 states.

Finally, the lot of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic somewhat resembles that of the Republic of China in that its fortunes have declined over the years, and that of Palestine, in that it has much more diplomatic support than empirical presence on the ground. It declared its independence in 1976, following the departure of the Spanish colonial administration, but its control of the Western Sahara is severely limited due to the Moroccan invasion in 1975 and the ensuing civil war. It now only governs the thin sliver of desert called the Free Zone, home to few people, and its government sits in Algerian exile. Nevertheless it is still recognised by more than 50 countries and is a member of the African Union.

The summaries in the book of these 10 cases are sufficiently detailed for an introduction to the particularities of each, and they are overall quite well-informed. Being summaries, the information is also readily available on the internet and in other literature, but it’s nice to have it all in one place. All ten owe their independence to unique historical crises, like the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and this ought to put at ease fears that their recognition would cause other secessionist regions to frivolously break away as well.

In particular, the section on Somaliland manages well to convey the absurdity of the fact that the international community refuses to recognise its independence, even though it is a well-governed state even by continent-wide standards, let alone the train wreck that is Somalia, for which it should be held up as a shining example. Instead, the international position amounts to demanding that Somaliland cease its rebellion and loyally return under the fold of a government that literally didn’t exist for much of the nineties and which since then has been unable to control even the entirety of its capital (Mogadishu).

The first, conceptual part of the book comprises three chapters. Of these, the third investigates some arrangements that can constitute an alternative to secession. As such, it is not very relevant in a book devoted to states that exist by virtue of the fact that they refuse to have their secession be undone. Some, like Northern Cyprus and perhaps the PMR may eventually give in, but the particular arrangements proposed for them are much better described in the dedicated sections of the book’s second part.

The first chapter discusses the definition of an independent state and recognition in international law and what makes a contested state contested. The second traces throughout history the status of the principle of self-determination in international law and the legality of secession. These two chapters are the intellectual core of the book, but the succession of often conflicting statements from international treaties and scholars in international law leaves one with the impression that at best, international law is merely descriptive in nature, and at worst, that it doesn’t really mean very much.

For example, the book describes one common view in international law (the declaratory theory of statehood) which holds that an independent state is formed by a government which considers itself independent, governing a certain permanently inhabited territory and its population. This definition is perfectly sensible, it is an apt empirical definition of what a state is. But then we don’t really need international law to tell us this — de jure independence turns out to be the same as de facto independence. Even worse, one might naively expect states to recognise other states as legally (de jure) independent based on a straight-forward evaluation of these criteria. But then none of the states under review would be contested. The fact of the matter is that states don’t seem to care about the international legal definition of a state. And why should they? After all, by their nature states are sovereign and can (within bounds) pretty damn well do as they please. It serves states’ interests much better to base state recognition on political considerations. But that pretty much obliterates the notion that there is universally valid international law. Instead, at best there are as many international legal realities as there are sovereign states (at worst, as many as there are people).

Geldenhuys notes that there is a competing view in international law on what constitutes an independent state, the constitutive theory. This holds that a state becomes independent by virtue of being recognised. Now, this makes de jure independence usefully different from de facto independence. But it reinforces the view that international law is completely in the eye of the beholder, since recognition is something states decide individually. And secondly, if legal independence is a consequence of recognition, it becomes inherently impossible for recognition to take into account the legal definition of independence. If international law fails to be prescriptive, can we still call it law, or does it simply reduce to international politics?

Of course, the author is not responsible for the general failings of the discipline. But in the end, he insufficiently manages to make sense of the conflicting opinions and practices in regards to statehood for the reader to be left much the wiser. The second half of the book presents a nice overview of the ten contested states, but this may only justify its rather steep price for a handful of people particularly interested in the topic.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Book reviews, Kosovo, Nagorno Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Palestine, Pridnestrovie, Sahrawi Republic, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Taiwan, The Great Recognition Game, , , , ,

Unclarity surrounding Vanuatu’s recognition of Abkhazia due to political crisis in Vanuatu?

Shortly after President Sergei Bagapsh’s death on May the 29th, Foreign Minister Maksim Gvinjia announced that Abkhazia and Vanuatu had established diplomatic relations on the 23rd and that by extension, Abkhazia had been recognised as an independent state by Vanuatu. The news was slowly taken up by various media while confirmation by Vanuatu’s government was not forthcoming. The only source which suggested that it had actually received a confirmation was the New York Times, but that could just have been a paraphrase of the Abkhazian Foreign Ministry’s statement. Of course, it doesn’t help that Vanuatu’s presence on the internet seems to be practically non-existent, even though it has about the same population size as Abkhazia (243,304 per the 2009 census).

Then on June the 3rd Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that Vanuatu’s ambassador to the UN had denied the news. Confusingly, on the same day, Radio Fiji came forward with more details about the alledged establishment of diplomatic relations. It reported that the agreement had been signed in Vanuatu’s capital, Port Vila, between Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Sato Kilman and Abkhazia’s Prime Minister Sergei Shamba.

All the while, the official website of Vanuatu’s government doesn’t carry any news more recent than May the 15th. Its most recent news item however provides one possible explanation for Vanuatu’s incoherent position. Apparently, on April the 24th a motion of no-confidence against Sato Kilman had been adopted by 26 of Parliament’s 52 members. This decision was then unsuccessfully challenged before court on the 30th, but on May the 13th the Court of Appeal found that the motion was unconstitutional since it had not been supported by an absolute majority and that Kilman’s government was to govern as before.

However, Kilman does not enjoy the support of half of Parliament’s members, and during his absence a new government had already been formed headed by Serge Vohor. All this should be sufficient reason for some disarray among Vanuatu’s government institutions. It also puts its recognition of Abkhazia’s independence (if it really happened) on a rather uncertain footing. Especially so since Vanuatu has previously gone back and forth on recognising Taiwan and the Sahrawi Republic and its stance in these matters seems to depend very much on the person who is currently Prime Minister.

The news report from Radio Fiji raises one other question. Did Sergei Shamba really fly all the way to the Pacific last week? If so, he has managed to keep it awfully quiet.

Filed under: Abkhazia, The Great Recognition Game, Vanuatu, , , , ,

Genocides and politics in the Caucasus – part 2

After previous deliberations, Georgia’s parliament has now on 20 May formally recognised the Circassian Genocide which took place towards the end of the Russian Empire’s conquest of the region, culminating in 1864.

In itself, it is a good thing that these events have been recognised for what they are. However, this is somewhat overshadowed by the fact that this was so obviously a political decision. Apart from the fact that it is clearly a result of Georgia’s current anger with Russia, if Georgia really aspires to the moral leadership of the Caucasus, it should also recognise the Armenian genocide, something Armenian groups have requested on several occasions. Moreover, as Thomas de Waal rightly points out, it is striking that Georgia has only recognised as genocide the Tsarist murder of Circassians, and not the very similar murder of Abkhaz in 1867 and 1877.

For this, two reasons suggest themselves. First, the territory left empty was populated by Russians and Armenians, but the events also marked the start of several waves of Georgian colonisation (both forced and voluntary). Second, in its declaration, the Georgian parliament has also decreed that deported Circassians should be recognised as refugees. If it would also recognise deported Abkhaz as refugees, it would be hard to disagree with Abkhazian efforts to bring about the return of its diaspora. It would also undermine Georgia’s claim that Abkhazia’s independence project is rejected by a majority of the people who have a right to live there.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Armenia, Circassians, Georgia, Russia, , ,

Ukraine next country to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

The list of countries who recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been increasing ever so slowly over the course of the last two years – at the rate of about one country every six months – so that the question arises: who’s next?

Belarus was long seen to be the country that came closest to deciding in favour of recognition, but its parliament has delayed discussing the matter so many times now that there is no way of telling when this might really happen.

Then last December Abkhazia submitted an official request for recognition to Ecuador, something which it would not do unless it had some hopes of it being accepted. But there are rumours according to which already in the autumn, Ecuador refused a Russian cash offer, and Raffael Correa may want to run an independent international course. Be that as it may, two months later Ecuador still hasn’t decided on the matter.

There are still more candidates. Qua foreign policy, Cuba seems perfectly positioned to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Perhaps it is still waiting to get a maximal reward from Russia. And just like it wasn’t very hard to convince Nauru to decide in favour of recognition, there are probably a whole number of countries in the Pacific (the Solomon Islands) and Africa (the Democratic Republic of the Congo) who would be willing to follow suit, given the proper financial incentives. Perhaps Russia is hoping to get countries for its money that play a somewhat larger role in international politics than these.

The fact of the matter is that Russia cannot afford the recognition process to stagnate. It is uncertain whether Daniel Ortega will even be allowed to stand in the 2011 Nicaraguan Presidential election, and if so, whether he would win, given that he won the last election only with a 38% plurality. And a new President may very well discontinue Nicaragua’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia if it is as controversial at that point in time as it is now – which would be very damaging to the entire recognition process. Venezuela’s recognition seems equally dependent on Hugo Chavez’s Presidency.

Of course what Abkhazia and South Ossetia really want is for a major international heavy weight to recognise them. Turkey, India and China are the most plausible options, perhaps South Africa. But that won’t happen in the short term, not with these particular countries. Instead – perhaps somewhat unexpectedly – the next country might very well be the Ukraine, which would almost be as good.

It now looks very likely that today’s Presidential election was won by Viktor Yanukovych. His party has in the past expressed its support for recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Russia will surely do its best to get this done. It depends on whether Yanukovych has the authority as President to make this decision himself, and if not, whether he can muster enough support in Parliament. But things look promising for Abkhazia and South Ossetia – even more so because Ukraine’s recognition would be so influential that it could pave the way for other countries from the former Soviet Union to follow, like Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan or Armenia. Who knows, perhaps even Belarus.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Belarus, Nicaragua, Russia, South Ossetia, The Great Recognition Game, Ukraine, , , ,

Did Russia plan to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a confederation?

The Russian newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets claims that after the August 2008 War, Russia was originally planning for Abkhazia and South Ossetia to form a confederation, and to recognise them as one state. The crux of the plan though was that the confederation would have been open for new members, specifically Georgia. However, despite Russia arguing that it would be easier to get other countries to recognise them together, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia refused. Apparently, the decision to instead recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia separately was then only taken three days before 26 August.

What to make of this story – is it true? It is not the first time that a newspaper reports about some secret plan for Abkhazia or South Ossetia, and most of these have seemed rather doubtful. In June 2008 it was Kommersant which claimed that Georgia had proposed dividing up Abkhazia to Russia. Perhaps we will know when the politicians involved write their autobiographies.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Russia, South Ossetia, The Great Recognition Game, , , , , , ,

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