Taklama

Icon

Commentary, current affairs and book reviews from Abkhazia and the wider Caucasus

13 March 2012 • 6:28 pm 0

Independents defeat prominent politicians in Abkhazia’s parliamentary elections

Last Saturday, on the 10th, Abkhazia held the first round of its fourth parliamentary elections since gaining independence. I have fitted the results into a big table on Wikipedia. The results from constituency 21 are not yet known, due to heavy snow fall, and there will be a rerun in constituency 1 as the 25% turnout threshold was missed by a hair.

These elections fit into a long-term trend: Abkhazian elections have been becoming ever more competitive. 148 candidates competed for just 35 seats, out of a total 156 that had originally been nominated. On average, four candidates competed in each constituency. And while there were five constituencies with just two candidates, there was also one constituency with as many as ten candidates. Accordingly, only 13 candidates won an outright first round majority, and no candidate won more than 75% of the votes cast.

The results are something of an upset, as many prominent politicians lost out to new, independent candidates. This includes a number of experienced MPs, like Communist Party leader Lev Shamba (11%), Chairman of the Human Rights Committee Batal Kobakhia (9%) and Vice-Speaker Sergei Matosyan (25%). Others, like Speaker Nugzar Ashuba (28%), Vice-Speaker Irina Agrba (27%) (a political ally of President Ankvab) and former Gali Governor Ruslan Kishmaria (27%) will have a very tough time winning their second round.

The elections were also disappointing for a number of former government members seeking to become MP. These include Anri Jergenia (22%), Prime Minister under President Ardzinba and once considered his successor, who in recent years supported opposition leader Raul Khajimba. Similarly unsuccessful was Almasbei Kchach (25%), Internal Affairs Minister and Security Council Secretary under Ardzinba, running mate of opposition leader Beslan Butba in 2009 and since then a prominent member of Butba’s Economic Development Party. Or Daur Tarba (9%) and Vakhtang Pipia (15%), both Vice-Premiers under President Bagapsh and the former Chairman of ruling party United Abkhazia. Indeed, opposition leader Raul Khajimba is about the only exception, achieving the highest first round win with 73% of the votes in his constituency — he may very well try to succeed Nugzar Ashuba as Speaker.

In general, all parties appear to have performed badly. The Communist Party saw none of its seven candidates win or even reach the second round. Only one of the six candidates nominated by the Economic Development Party reached the second round. Of the eleven candidates nominated by United Abkhazia, only one was elected outright, and only four reached the second round. Of the eleven candidates nominated by the Forum for National Unity, one candidate was elected outright (Khajimba) and six reached the second round. This means that independent candidates will form a majority in the new Parliament. Even though these may still end up forming pro-government and opposition camps, this could mean a more active and self-conscious Parliament.

In the light of the very poor performance by United Abkhazia, the question is justified whether these results constitute a defeat for President Ankvab. The answer is probably no, Given that United Abkhazia is not Ankvab’s party, even though it supports him, and that he has distanced himself somewhat from the United Abkhazia-led government of his predecessor, Sergei Bagapsh. That said, the results do indicate that voters are thoroughly dissatisfied with the current Parliament and with past governments. This should provide a strong incentive for President Ankvab to intensify his reforms.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, Wikipedia, , , , , ,

21 December 2011 • 4:02 pm 0

South Ossetia’s post-election struggle refocuses on March rerun

The post-election stand-off in South Ossetia between rightful winner Alla Dzhioyeva and the authorities seemed to come to an end with the agreement reached on Friday 9 December. However, while most of the agreement’s letter was adhered to, its spirit was violated.

As provisioned, Alla Dzhioyeva called on her supporters to stop their protests, she called off her inauguration and she publicly accepted the Supreme Court’s decision to declare the election invalid and to schedule a March rerun, in exchange for her being allowed to participate therein. However, while President Kokoity did as agreed dismiss Chief Prosecutor Taimuraz Khugayev and Chairman of the Supreme Court Atsamaz Bichenov, ratification of these dismissals was voted down on Wednesday 15 December by Parliament, controlled by Kokoity’s Unity party. Furthermore, Kokoity appointed several of his allies to the cabinet and to a newly resurrected Constitutional Court. Finally, neither Dzhioyeva nor any of her allies were appointed to the government, although it is unclear whether this was part of the final agreement.

While these actions prompted Dzhioyeva’s supporters to resume protests, these seem to have been half-hearted at best. Dzhioyeva herself raised Kokoity’s violations of the agreement with its guarantor, the Russian Embassy, but was rebuffed. It appears then that despite the fact that she has received far less out of the deal than she had hoped for, Dzhioyeva has resigned herself to a repeat election. The biggest worry for her is whether the election will be as fair as the first time and whether at least the clause that guarantees her right to participate in the rerun will be honoured. In this respect, it is especially worrying that the Head of the Supreme Court has remained in place and that Kokoity now also has allies of his control a Constitutional Court. In addition, March is a long time away and Dzhioyeva may find it hard to rekindle public outrage when her participation is ruled out in February.

That said, the deal did achieve one thing for Dzhioyeva. Kokoity resigned as President on Saturday 10 December (3 days after his term formally expired) and was replaced by Prime Minister Vadim Brovtsev who is Acting President until a new President is sworn in. Brovtsev is Russia’s man, and certainly not a friend of Kokoity’s. That means that as before, South Ossetia is still facing a three-way struggle. Russia controls the Presidency and can exert strong external pressure. Kokoity controls the institutions (Parliament, Supreme and Constitutional Court) and thus the legal playing field. The opposition has the people’s support and it is the only side with a credible candidate.

At the moment, Kokoity’s position looks strongest, which is a remarkable come-back given that none of the original election’s second round’s candidates were his. But the struggle can probably be won by any two sides that decide to cooperate. It is unlikely that this will be Kokoity and the opposition, so it is up to Russia to make up its mind as to whether it prefers a continuation of Kokoity’s corrupt and ineffectual regime, or it is prepared to admit its past mistakes and give the opposition a chance.

Filed under: Elections, Russia, South Ossetia, , , , , , ,

4 December 2011 • 12:47 am 0

Snow Revolution or South Ossetian Winter?

So it has come to this. For a short while, South Ossetia’s Presidential election looked like a total win. The polling wasn’t merely quite free and fair, South Ossetia’s electorate actually handed a preliminary 56.74% second round majority to Alla Dzhioyeva, the opposition candidate, against Anatoly Bibilov, the candidate openly endorsed not only by autocratic President Kokoity and his Unity party, but also by Russia’s government (whose President Medvedev went so far as to schedule a personal meeting with Bibilov). Alas, before long the election descended into chaos after all.

After the publication of the preliminary results which indicated Dzhioyeva’s victory, the Unity party filed a complaint with the Supreme Court saying that Dzhioyeva’s campaign had engaged in voter intimidation, which the Supreme Court promptly ruled in favour of. It forbade the Central Election Commission to publish the second round’s final results, it ordered the Parliament to set a date for a repeat election, and it barred Dzhioyeva from participating therein.

Quite understandably, Dzhioyeva and her supporters have not accepted the Supreme Court’s ruling. And quite rightly, given that election observers declared the election more or less free and fair. So the situation has developed into a stand-off, with Dzhioyeva’s supporters on the streets in protest, and Kokoity and Moscow declaring that the Supreme Court’s ruling must be respected.

The current situation carries a strong sense of déjà vu, being so very similar to Abkhazia’s ‘Tangerine Revolution’ in the autumn of 2004. One would have thought that Russia’s authorities had learned from that experience, and given its non-interference in Abkhazia’s election this past August, it did seem that way. South Ossetia is even more dependent on Russian support than Abkhazia, its inhabitants probably consider Russia even more favourably, and South Ossetia is of less geopolitical interest to Russia to Abkhazia. So for all intents and purposes, the outcome of the election should have been much less important to Russia than the fact that they were conducted credibly. After all, the credibility of Russia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia squarely rests on the credibility of their respective state projects.

So what exactly does Russia think it is doing? Perhaps Russian officials were so fed up with the massive misuse of aid funds under Kokoity that despite the past negative experience in Abkhazia they decided to openly endorse someone they believed would be able to manage things properly, Bibilov. And perhaps they simply didn’t trust Dzhioyeva to do a good enough job. It is also possible that Moscow’s current insistence that the ruling of South Ossetia’s Supreme Court be respected reflects a genuine desire not to interfere in internal affairs. But that is a very charitable reading of events, and it is much more likely that in the reported words of Moskovsky Komsomolets editorial, the Russian officials responsible are not merely bastards, but morons.

Given the familiarity of the scenario that is enrolling now, current events have already been labelled the Snow Revolution, a designation that is perhaps not very catchy, but very fitting given the meteorological backdrop of Dzhioyeva’s vigil. Yet despite the very similar set-up, there are some important differences in comparison to the Tangerine Revolution in Abkhazia. Unfortunately for Dzhioyeva, South Ossetia’s parliament and all the Republic’s top officials seem securely on the hand of Kokoity and Bibilov. In 2004, Abkhazia’s Parliament and its Vice President favoured opposition candidate Bagapsh, while the security services declared their neutrality. The current legal situation is also different. There is now a Supreme Court ruling that is not easily overturned, whereas in Abkhazia in 2004, Khajimba’s supporters merely forced the Central Election Commission to issue revised results, a decision that could easily be undone once more. So while Dzhioyeva may be an excellent personification of a people patiently but adamantly refusing to have its will be denied, she is facing a formidable challenge. Instead of a Snow revolution, her people may simply face a South Ossetian Winter.

On the other hand, there are also difference that speak in favour of a positive outcome. The election result and the injustice is much clearer now than during the Tangerine Revolution in 2004, when Bagapsh scored a mere 50.08% majority, when the participation of Mingrelian voters was indeed questionable from a constitutional point of view and when the alternative was a comparatively reasonable second round run-off. Also, whereas in 2004, outgoing President Vladislav Ardzinba was the father of the Abkhazian nation and his words carried a lot of weight, South Ossetia’s President Kokoity is an upshot ex-wrestler who enjoys little respect. Finally, South Ossetia is notoriously small, its population in the tens of thousands. In such a small community, where everyone knows everyone, including officials, it will prove hard to ignore the determined will of the people when it feels it has been subjected to a grave injustice.

Maurice Bonnot of the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation in Paris expressed the problem very elegantly: South Ossetia’s political actors need to learn how to lose.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, Russia, South Ossetia, , , , , ,

18 November 2011 • 2:08 pm 0

South Ossetia’s presidential election suprisingly competitive

On 13 November, South Ossetia held its fourth Presidential election since independence, and expectations were low, given the authoritarian tendencies of President Kokoity and the fact that many opposition candidates had been excluded unfairly or because they didn’t satisfy the harsh 10-year residency requirement. It was predicted by some that Kokoity — who couldn’t run for a third term — would want to ‘do a Putin’ — become Prime Minister, Parliament Speaker or party leader and continue to lead South Ossetia. Also, Moscow had a clear preferred candidate in the form of Emergency Affairs Minister Anatoli Bibilov, who through falsification might have taken a landslide victory (Kokoity himself was re-elected in 2006 with 98% of the votes).

However, the results are surprisingly hopeful. The election requires a second round, a rare thing in the Caucasus. What is more, the two front runners, Bibilov and former Education Minister Alla Dzhioyeva only scored 25% each, which is little even by word-wide standards. The election is also the first in the Caucasus with a female candidate who stands a serious chance of winning (Dzhioyeva). Of course, instead of hailing this achievement, Kokoity then vowed that no woman could become President of South Ossetia, this being the Caucasus…

The first round results and the fact that there is no reliable opinion polling in South Ossetia mean that the fight for the second round is wide open. It was widely perceived that Kokoity had supported his own candidates in the first round rather than Bibilov, so the latter could now enjoy the undivided support of South Ossetian authorities. In her turn, Dzhioyeva may be able to attract the support of other opposition candidates, whose first round results combine to more than 25%. A victory by Dzhioyeva would probably be the best result for South Ossetian society, and it might actually happen.

Filed under: Elections, South Ossetia, ,

3 July 2011 • 2:18 pm 0

Wikipedia: Abkhazia’s Presidential election

As more and more becomes known about Abkhazia’s upcoming Presidential election, I (and others) will gather the information in the corresponding Wikipedia article.

Similar articles exist for the February 2011 local elections and the 2009, 2005 and 2004 Presidential elections.

As of now, as expected Raul Khajimba and Alexander Ankvab have been nominated by initiative groups, while Sergei Shamba has said that he is waiting for the 40 day mourning period after Sergei Bagapsh’s death to pass. Khajimba has also received the backing of his opposition party, the Forum for the National Unity of Abkhazia, and he his to run with Svetlana Jergenia as his running mate, who is the widow of first President Vladislav Ardzinba. He is evidently hoping to thus profit from Ardzinba’s status as a national hero, but it should be noted that Jergenia narrowly failed to win a seat in Parliament in the 2007 election (admittedly before Ardzinba passed away).

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, Wikipedia, , , , , ,

29 May 2011 • 10:29 pm 3

Who will succeed Sergei Bagapsh?

For the first week or so after the unexpected death of President Sergei Bagapsh this morning, following surgery in Moscow, Abkhazia will predominantly be mourning. But then the question of his succession will inevitably come up. In line with the constitution, Vice President Alexander Ankvab is now acting President, but an election has to be organised within three months, that is before August the 29th.

Had Bagapsh not died, Abkhazia could possibly have enjoyed three more years of steady growth and a dozen or so of additional countries to recognise its independence. This could have strengthened Abkhazia’s statehood to an extend where even a bad outcome of the next election would not have been able to do as much damage as e.g. President Kokoity is doing now for South Ossetia. However, this was not to be, which means that a lot depends on the qualities of the next President of Abkhazia.

Conversely, as wry as it may sound, Bagapsh’s death may also have positive consequences for Abkhazia. It is a cynical fact that now that he has passed away, Bagapsh’s legacy will be very positive, which will both set a positive norm domestically and improve Abkhazia’s reputation abroad. Also, the fact in itself that Abkhazia will now witness another democratic transition will have similar effects. And while a new President could disappoint, this does not need to be the case. After Bagapsh became President, a lot changed for the better. But many reforms seem to have slowed down, and his government has failed to solve any of the bomb attacks that have hit Abkhazia during the last couple of years, nor the murder of Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs Zakan Jugelia, nor any of the four attempts at Alexander Ankvab’s life. Add to this the general impression that too many Abkhazian official see their post as a business opportunity first and a responsibility to be taken serious second, and it is clear that there is a lot of room for improvement which an energetic newcomer could tackle.

So what are the likely candidates in the upcoming election?

Within the government there are two obvious candidates, Alexander Ankvab and Sergei Shamba. Both have aspired to the Presidency in the past and may find that now the time is ripe to achieve their ambitions.

Ankvab is a member of Aitaira, which was formed in the Nineties by government officials who were dissatisfied with President Ardzinba’s policies. Ankvab was planning to run in the 2004 election to succeed Ardzinba, but his candidacy was rejected on the grounds that he did not satisfy the residency requirement and competence in the Abkhaz language. This was probably foul play, but it led Ankvab to support Sergei Bagapsh’s candidacy, and he became Prime Minister after the latter had won the election and the ensuing stand-off with Ardzinba’s preferred candidate Raul Khajimba (the ‘Tangerine revolution’). Then, in 2009, when Bagapsh was re-elected, Ankvab became his Vice-President. If he chooses to run, Ankvab could take his ally, chairman of Aitaira and First Vice-Premier Leonid Lakerbaia as his running mate. Alternatively he could pick Natela Aqaba, chair of the Public Chamber which unites civil society representatives.

Shamba too is a very experienced politician, perhaps even more so than Ankvab. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1997 and held the post until 2004 when he resigned in protest following the murder of opposition member Garri Aiba and to prepare his own candidacy for the presidency. In the election, he scored a respectable third place behind Bagapsh and Khajimba and thus established himself as an independent force. The post-election crisis eventually ended with a power-sharing agreement between Bagapsh and Khajimba under which Khajimba (who became Vice-President) selected Shamba to serve once more as Foreign Minister. Khajimba eventually left the government to try his luck again in the 2009 election, but Shamba stayed on and declared himself neutral, allowing him to take Ankvab’s place as Prime Minister after Bagapsh’s re-election.

Interestingly, neither Ankvab nor Shamba is a member of the main governing party United Abkhazia. Shamba used to be a member but was ejected in 2005 for running as an independent candidate in the 2004 election after he had lost the Vice-Presidential party nomination to historian Stanislav Lakoba. This leaves open the possibility that United Abkhazia might field its own candidate, who would stand a decent chance, since United Abkhazia has by far the best Abkhazian party network. United Abkhazia’s chairman Daur Tarba might be that candidate. His career has seen a steady upward trajectory during the last years, culminating in his becoming Vice-Premier in 2010, following Bagapsh’s re-election. However, he unexpectedly resigned last February, and some have mooted that Tarba’s Presidential ambitions had something to do with it. If so, these elections may come too early for his plans.

It also remains to be seen what the third government party, Amtsakhara, will do, which consists mainly of war veterans. It is no longer as influential as when it was first formed in the latter years of Ardzinba’s presidency, but it has a solid core base of supporters and counts some government ministers among its members. As such, it may prove to be a useful junior partner in any Presidential bid, and possibly field a Vice-Presidential candidate.

Among the ranks of the opposition, Raul Khajimba is the most obvious contender. He is still the most prominent leader of the opposition and has clearly not given up on his presidential elections. A second possible candidate is businessman Beslan Butba, who has initiated a lot of social projects, has styled himself as a new type of politician with no ties to Ardzinba’s government and also participated in the 2009 election, although his result there was disappointing. A third figure worth mentioning is Emma Tania, who is currently Vice-Speaker of the People’s Assembly and has been relatively active lately. All opposition politicians have one common problem, and that is the death of Sergei Bagapsh. People are still relatively satisfied with the current government, and it will be hard to criticise the policies of a dead hero, for Bagapsh will surely now be eulogised.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

3 March 2011 • 12:50 pm 0

Abkhazian local elections show lack of competitiveness outside Sukhum, Gagra and Gudauta

Abkhazian democracy has many weaknesses, but presidential and parliamentary elections during the last 10 years stood out for their high level of competitiveness. The recent local elections, held on February the 12th, illustrate how uneven Abkhazia’s development has been.

Voters elected the fifth convocations of the local assemblies of Abkhazia’s districts and the capital Sukhum, in single seat constituencies, according to the first-past-the-post system also used for the United Kingdom’s Lower House. From the elected deputies, President Sergei Bagapsh then appointed the district heads and the mayors of the city of Sukhum and the towns of Novii Afon and Pitsunda, so effectively the current heads of the executives also stood for re-election.

The results varied greatly from region to region.

On the one hand, 85 candidates competed for 26 seats in Sukhum, with as many as 8 candidates competing for one seat in constituency #25. Only 15 incumbent deputies stood for re-election, and only 5 of these succeeded (including incumbent Mayor Alias Labakhua). Ruling party United Abkhazia fielded candidates in all constituencies, but only won in 16. Some 20% of the candidates were aged between 20 and 25. And when the first meeting of the new assembly attempted to elect a new chairman, the vote resulted in a draw and had to be rescheduled.

On the other hand, none of the 26 seats in the Gali District were contested by more than one candidate. All 26 candidates were nominated by United Abkhazia. And only a minority of the population enjoyed the right to vote, since only a minority holds Abkhazian citizenship.

The other districts rank somewhere in between these two extremes. In the Gagra and Gudauta Districts, there were 61 and 59 candidates for respectively 25 and 29 seats. The head of the Gudauta District Daur Vozba actually failed to be re-elected, losing by 92 votes. But in the Sukhum, Ochamchira, Gulripsh and Tkuarchal Districts, a significant number of constituencies went uncontested.

There were also negative trends affecting all regions, such as the scarcity of female candidates. Sukhum’s new City Council does not contain a single female deputy. Another general problem was the apathy of the opposition parties, none of which had nominated candidates, preferring instead to back individual independent candidates. And while the high turn-over rate of deputies in Sukhum and the large number of very young candidates can be seen as a positive fact, some commentators think that it could also point to candidates mostly seeing the job as a good business-opportunity.

There was also a curious detail to the election in Sukhum: the new secretary of the City Council is none other than Astamur Adleiba. Adleiba had been appointed mayor by President Bagapsh after the latter was first elected in 2005. But in 2007, while Bagapsh was in Moscow for medical treatment, it emerged that Adleiba and some other municipal officials had embezzled large sums of money. At the time, it was thought that perhaps the scandal had intentionally been brought to light by Vice President Raul Khajimba to discredit Bagapsh. In any case, Adleiba was dismissed as mayor, had to repay 200,000 rubles and eventually resigned as deputy of the City Council. Now he has again been elected, on a United Abkhazia ticket.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, , , , ,

29 January 2011 • 1:56 am 0

Sergei Matosyan elected Vice Speaker of Abkhazia’s People’s Assembly after all

Last May Albert Hovsepyan resigned as Vice Speaker of the People’s Assembly of Abkhazia. At the time, he was the highest ranking Armenian in Abkhazia, and I posited that it represented a setback to Armenian integration into the Abkhazian state. All the more so since he had not been succeeded by another Armenian (or anyone else for that matter). The prime candidate would have been Sergei Matosyan, whom Hovsepyan had originally defeated when he was elected Vice Speaker.

Now it appears that Sergei Matosyan did in fact succeed Hovsepyan, albeit with some delay: on 24 September. It is notable that unlike Hovsepyan, Matosyan is a member of the opposition. He was Deputy Minister of the Interior under Abkhazia’s first President Vladislav Ardzinba, and he very briefly became Minister for Emergency Affairs in December 2004. During the October 2004 Presidential Election, he supported Sergei Shamba’s candidacy and he was one of the leaders of his Social-Democratic Party. When the opposition war veterans organisation Aruaa was founded on 17 May 2007, Matosyan was elected to its supreme council.

Being a member of the opposition probably explains why Matosyan was elected with only 22 votes (the assembly has 35 members, of which 24 cast a vote). On the other hand, Matosyan is a Hero of Abkhazia due to his achievements in the 1992-1993 war with Georgia. It is not clear whether there were any other candidates. The only other Armenian member of the Assembly is Valery Mayromyan, who seems to have a comparatively modest track record.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, , , , , , , ,

19 January 2011 • 12:46 am 0

Grenade attack mars Chuburxinji by-election in Abkhazia

After the death of People’s Assembly member Yuri Kereselidze on November the 1st, the resulting by-election for the Chuburxinji constituency was held Sunday the 9th of January. It was won by Ruslan Kishmaria, the President’s special representative for the Gali district. Kishmaria has long been seen as a moderate figure who has a relatively good understanding with the Mingrelian population.

But the election took a violent turn when a grenade exploded on election day close to Kishmaria’s opponent Gocha Jalagonia, while he was leaving a local church. Jalagonia stated that his relationship with Kishamaria is good, but there seems to be no doubt that he was the target of the attack. Rather incredulously, this is being denied by the public prosecutor, who put the incident down to ‘hooliganism’. Jalagonia was hospitalised with a severe headache, and released on the next morning.

According to the election commission, Kishmaria won 69% of the votes, with the turnout at 42%.

Filed under: Abkhazia, Elections, , , , , , ,

28 December 2010 • 9:16 pm 1

Book review: Uncertain Democracy by Lincoln A. Mitchell

Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution
Lincoln A. Mitchell
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia
December 2008
192 pages
ISBN: 978-0-8122-4127-3

Georgia’s November 2003 Rose Revolution has been a popular subject for articles, analyses and opinion pieces. Most of these appear well timed for the yearly November anniversary, and many feature a title with some play on the word rose. Probably more so than Serbia’s Plum, Abkhazia’s Tangerine, Ukraine’s Orange and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip revolution, the Rose Revolution stands out as a significant historical event, as truly revolutionary, perhaps because it most strongly gives off the impression that things are not as they were before. Given this state of affairs, it is quite welcome that there is now also a book, written by someone who witnessed events from close by, without being directly involved himself: Lincoln A. Mitchell. Mitchell was chief of party for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in Georgia from 2002 until 2004. Aware of the Rose Revolution literature’s cliché-ridden headlining tradition, Mitchell named his book Uncertain Democracy.

Mitchell’s angle for Uncertain Democracy is the democracy assistance Georgia has received throughout the years. The Rose Revolution has been subject to a lot of oversimplification and misrepresentation. In the most naive variants, it is cast as a transition from dictatorship to democracy, brought about either by a people fed up with oppression, and/or by benign/nefarious (depending on one’s perspective) United States plotting. The truth of course, is much more complicated, and the caveats go far beyond the now often heard observation that Saakashvili’s post-Rose Revolution government is not as democratic as it once was. Mitchell gives a fine analysis of how the Rose Revolution came about. Few of his observations will be surprising or completely new in themselves, but together they paint a picture markedly more subtle than the received narrative. Some of the highlights are listed below:

  • Shevardnadze’s pre-Rose Revolution government wasn’t the dictatorship it is sometimes made out to be. It was not a legitimate democracy, but there was a considerable amount of civil liberties. Without this relatively free environment, the events leading up to the Rose Revolution would never have been possible.
  • At the same time, Saakashvili’s Georgia isn’t a full democracy either, and, this is not merely a recent development, but something which was true right from the start. While the Rose Revolution has probably made Georgia more democratic overall, with markedly improved elections and reduced corruption, certain other areas like media freedom and the quality of party politics have deteriorated since before the Rose Revolution.
  • The Rose Revolution was much less a transformation from dictatorship to democracy than a transformation from a very weak and dysfunctional to a strong and effective state. And this is not accidental — state failure is what motivated people to rise up in protest against Shevardnadze, and effective government was perhaps a more widely professed goal of the Rose Revolution than democracy, with Saakashvili notably expressing the hope to emulate David the Builder, Atatürk, Ben-Gurion and De Gaulle.
  • The Rose Revolution was triggered by the fraudulent 3 November 2003 parliamentary election, but Shevardnadze did not actually rig that election to the extend that previous elections had been rigged. Pre-election manipulations apart, Shevardnadze’s For a New Georgia bloc received only 2 seats more than it should have according to exit polls and parallel vote tabulation. Most of the fraud took place in Ajara, in favour of Abashidze’s Revival party (allied to Shevardnadze). Interestingly, even according to the official results, the opposition had won a majority in parliament, and half of the opposition parties were content with the result. Crucially though, Saakashvili’s National Movement-United Front did get shortchanged significantly, and he did not accept the results.
  • In 2003, few opposition leaders were new faces in Georgian politics. Zhvania, Saakashvili, Gamkrelidze and Burjanadze had previously been prominent members of Shevardnadze’s Citizens Union of Georgia, Burjanadze right up until August 2003. Zhvania had lead the Citizens Union’s very fraudulent 1999 parliamentary election campaign. The only major opposition politician who had not previously been part of the Citizens Union was Natalashvili, whose Labour Party had been cheated out of parliament in 1999. The Labour Party was the second largest opposition party in 2003 and was the only other party to suffer as much from the election fraud as the National Movement-United Front. But Natalashvili committed the mistake of not joining the subsequent protests even as his supporters did, and was thus politically marginalised following the Rose Revolution.
  • The Rose Revolution did not, at least initially, attract huge masses of protesters. It started off with only a couple of thousand of people, and did not reach 100,000 until its climax on the 22nd. For the largest part, it featured less people than the failed protests in 2007 and 2009. The Rose revolution only succeeded because Shevardnadze’s government was so weak, and mishandled the situation so completely.
  • From Shevardnadze’s position, the Rose Revolution was wholly unnecessary. This was not a presidential election, so his position was not directly at stake. Furthermore, he had said repeatedly hat he wanted to step down anyway at the end of his term, so the composition of parliament should not have been so important as to risk his political legacy over. Finally, the Citizens Union of Georgia was in shambles, so he could have allowed his protégés to step into his political footsteps, even if they were now the leaders of the opposition.
  • The Rose Revolution was not in any way ‘engineered’ by American funded NGOs. But it was made possible by democracy assistance, which educated many of its key actors, and which made available the necessary tools to expose election fraud, such as parallel vote tabulation.
  • The Rose Revolution was also not directly wanted by the United States. Despite considerable disappointment in Shevardnadze, he was still seen as pro-Western and to some degree as a ‘reformer’. It was hoped that someone more committed to reforms would succeed him in the next presidential election. But in November 2003, Shevardnadze was one of the few world leaders who unambiguously supported the United States war in Iraq, so engineering a revolution against him would not have made much sense.

The account in Uncertain Democracy shows that the Rose Revolution was a significant, albeit only relative step towards democracy. But it has been oversimplified in the minds of policy makers, and Mitchell argues that this has actually impeded democracy assistance in Georgia. After all, if Georgia is now a democracy, then democracy assistance is no longer necessary, and if the defenders of democracy are now in power in Georgia, then any democratic shortcoming must be due to inexperience, and cannot really be the government’s fault. Indeed, American democracy funding for Georgia has been cut back after the Rose Revolution, while civil society has also been weakened by the outflow of many activists who took up posts in Saakashvili’s government.

Uncertain Democracy stands out for its nuanced, informed, comprehensive and fair content. Sadly, its writing is at times unsatisfactory. Especially in the sections on democracy assistance, the prose is sometimes cumbersome and verbose. This is compounded by a number of misspellings and other small errors, as well as foreshadowings which remain unfulfilled. These flaws mean that Uncertain Democracy will not become the definite book about the Rose Revolution. Such a book would also require more than 5 years of hindsight and more access to confidential sources, which, to his credit, Mitchell acknowledges. However, Mitchell has succeeded in exploiting his unique experience as an outsider who witnessed the Rose Revolution form close by in crafting a book that, at least for the time being, is the principal English language reference on the subject.

—

Note: Uncertain Democracy is rather critical of Georgia’s post Rose Revolution government, but to Saakashvili’s credit, he recommends the book on its back as “essential reading”.

Filed under: Book reviews, Elections, Georgia, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Recent tweets

Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 122 other followers

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 122 other followers